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CONCEIVABLE CHANGES: EFFECTUATING
INFERTILE COUPLES' EMOTIONAL TIES TO
FROZEN EMBRYOS THROUGH NEW DISPOSITION
OPTIONS
Jody Lyne6 Madeira*
I. INTRODUCTION
In mid-April of 2010, Reuters reported a thought-provoking scientific
breakthrough: British scientists at Newcastle University had "mastered a
controversial technique in cloning technology" to prevent inherited mitochondrial
diseases by "swapping DNA between two fertilized human eggs."' According to
the news report, an estimated one in 6500 children are born with mitochondrial
diseases, which are caused by malfunctioning mitochondrial DNA and result in
"fatal heart problems, liver failure, brain disorders, blindness, and muscular
weakness."2 "There has been very limited success in devising effective
treatments for mitochondrial disease."3 Mitochondrial DNA is passed down
through the maternal line, so mitochondrial disease can be detected in the eggs of
affected women.4
For the benefit of readers unversed in the finer points of genetics, the
article analogized mitochondrial DNA to "tiny energy-generating batteries inside
cells," so that switching DNA between two embryos becomes like "changing the
battery on a laptop."5 The exact technique, however, is a bit more complex.
Within a day after joining a female egg with male sperm through in vitro
fertilization ("IVF"), scientists remove the nuclear DNA from the embryo and
implant it into a donor egg whose nucleus has been removed and discarded.
Posing the question "Two or Three Parents?" for dramatic effect, the article
reassured readers that children born from embryos whose diseased mitochondrial
DNA had been exchanged for healthy donor mitochondrial DNA would have
correctly functioning mitochondria, but "in every other respect would get all their
genetic information from their mother and father."7
However miraculous this may seem, more scientific developments were
in store. When the Newcastle University researchers published their findings in
the May 6, 2010 edition of Nature, they revealed that they had actually
* Associate Professor of Law, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania, 2003; Ph.D., Annenberg School for Communication, University of
Pennsylvania, 2007. The author would like to thank June Carbone and Dawn Johnson for their
invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this piece.
1 Ben Hirschler, DNA Egg Swap Prevents Rare Diseases in Babies, REuTERS, Apr. 14, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63D3OB20100414.
3 Lyndsey Craven et al., Pronuclear Transfer in Human Embryos to Prevent Transmission of
Mitochondrial DNA Disease, 465 NATuRE 82, 82 (2010).
4 Hirschler, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6id.
7id.
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succeeded not only in transferring nuclear DNA from an embryo into a donor egg
with healthy mitochondrial DNA, but in transferring nuclear DNA between two
fertilized embryos (transferring one or two nuclei from a donor embryo into a
recipient embryo).8  Scientists estimated that at most two percent of the
mitochondrial DNA is carried over but found that many of the embryos contained
no detectable mitochondrial DNA from the contributing embryo.9  The
researchers concluded that, while pronuclear transfer could potentially prevent
mitochondrial disease in humans, the effects of genetic manipulation could
hypothetically cause chromosomal or other genetic abnormalities and required
further study.'0 The manipulated embryos appeared to be viable, living for six to
eight days in the laboratory, continuing to divide until they reached the blastocyst
stage consisting of approximately 100 cells." Researchers were hopeful that
therapeutic mitochondrial manipulation would be available within three years.' 2
Using this technique, however, would require a change in British law banning the
use of manipulated embryos for reproductive purposes.13  As will be seen,
however, such therapeutic techniques stand to significantly change the
disposition options open to infertile couples with excess frozen embryos.
This nuclear transfer technique fits into a broader trajectory of research
in which certain components of embryos, such as nuclei and cytoplasm, are
interchanged with others from donor gametes or donor embryos. Such
embryonic transfer techniques are not necessarily "new"; eradicating
mitochondrial disease is just one of the latest possible uses of such technology.
Older women with "aging" eggs and women with "poor quality" eggs may have
their eggs "rejuvenated" with cytoplasm donations from younger women.14
Cytoplasmic transfer was first pioneered in 1996 by Dr. Jacques Cohen, an
embryologist at the Institute for Reproductive Medicine and Science at St.
Barnabas Medical Center in New Jersey.' 5  The results of his research were
published in Human Reproduction in March, 2001, where Cohen and his
colleagues reported that nearly thirty babies worldwide had been born through
8 Craven et al., supra note 3, at 82. The embryos used in the study had been "abnormally"
fertilized, meaning that they had one or three pronuclei at the one-cell stage; such embryos are not
normally used in fertility treatment. Id.
9Id.
0 Id.
1 Hirschler, supra note 1.
I12 id.
Ol1d.
14 See Holly Firfer, How Far Will Some Couples Go to Conceive?: Some Travel Overseas for
Fertility Treatment Banned in U.S., CNN, June 17, 2004,
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/03/12/infertility.treatment/index.html (stating that
cytoplasmic transfer can be used for patients whose eggs are aged).
15 See Jacques Cohen et al., Cytoplasmic Transfer in Assisted Reproduction, 7 HuM. REPROD.
UPDATE 428 (2001).
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the use of such techniques.' 6 Cohen and his research fellows asserted that such
techniques are especially useful for patients who consistently experience "poor
embryo development and implantation failure" during IVF and who would
otherwise have to resort to donor eggs; instead, cytoplasmic transfer "may now
restore normal growth and viability to their own developmentally compromised
embryos."l 7 The researchers reported that two babies born through cytoplasmic
transfer carried mitochondrial DNA from both the recipient and the donor, a
condition known as "heteroplasmy," but that none of the donor's chromosomal
DNA was inherited.' 8 However, two out of eighteen fetuses developed Turner's
Syndrome, a chromosomal abnormality in which one of the two female X
chromosomes is missing that usually causes early miscarriage.' 9 This incidence
rate of eleven percent is much higher than the one to six percent rate incidence of
major congenital abnormalities observed in the general population; researchers
cautioned that it could have resulted from "the increase in sex chromosome
aneuploidy observed following [intracytoplasmic sperm injection] ... as well as
maternal age."20
Alarmed by these results, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
took action shortly after the Human Reproduction Update article was published.
In a letter to clinicians dated July 6, 2001, the FDA asserted regulatory authority
over "human cells used in therapy involving the transfer of genetic material by
means other than the union of gamete nuclei," and defined genetic material to
include cell nuclei, egg nuclei, and cytoplasm.21 Concerned over the long-term
effects of genetic manipulation, the FDA promulgated new regulations requiring
clinicians to complete an Investigational New Drug application, and follow the
same procedures as developers of new prescription 'medications, including
obtaining informed consent from patients participating in testing and conducting
regimented clinical trials.2 2 According to the FDA, genetically manipulated
embryos are "cellular and tissue-based products" and subject to regulation under
the same logic as medical apparatus and drugs.23 As a result of the FDA's
actions, gene transfer procedures in the United States have been effectively
banned since 2001 and will remain banned until rigorous testing proves them to
be safe-something that is unlikely to ever occur due to bans on federal funding
16 Jason A. Barritt, et al., Epigenetic and Experimental Modifications in Early Mammalian
Development: Part II, Cytoplasmic Transfer in Assisted Reproduction, 7 HuM. REPROD. UPDATE
428, 428 (2001).
17 Id.
" Id. at 433.
' Id. at 429-30.
20 id,
21 Letter from Kathryn C. Zoon, Dir. of the Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research of themFood
& Drug Admin, to Sponsors/Researchers (July 6, 2001), available at
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/ucml 05852.htm.
22 id.
23 Id.
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for such research and the scarcity of private funds.24 Most cytoplasmic transfer
research has taken place abroad.
These findings open up numerous cans of worms, some more obvious
than others. Gene therapy usually raises concerns over the ethics of cloning
technology and debates over the moral status of embryos. 2 5 But such research
also offers promising solutions to the existing controversial problem of excess
embryos, opening up new disposition options for infertile couples who have
undergone IVF and have excess embryos in frozen storage. An estimated
500,000 cryopreserved embryos in the United States await either disposition or
destruction for lack of disposition, arid approximately 20,000 more embryos are
frozen each year.26
Research on infertile couples' disposition decision-making has found that
infertile couples feel emotionally bonded to their embryos and are concerned for
their welfare, and that couples' choice of disposition is strongly influenced by
these affective ties.27 Allowing couples to donate their frozen embryos for
cytoplasmic transfer would not only increase the number of available disposition
options but it would also have positive implications for couples' perceived
emotional connections to their embryos. Currently, many infertile couples report
dissatisfaction with the range of choices; as Lyerly and others observe, "the
options they face are either unacceptable to them, or other options that would be
acceptable are not available." 2 8
This essay addresses the impact of infertile couples' affective ties to their
excess cryopreserved embryos impacts how they choose to dispose of those
embryos, and how inter-embryonic transfer can change this calculus. It first
documents how infertile couples come to form emotional connections to their
frozen embryos and how these attachments are influenced by three factors:
judgments about frozen embryos' moral status, feelings of responsibility towards
24 Dr. Jamie Grifo, the New York fertility specialist who has used nuclear-transfer techniques, was
asked why he had not done safety testing first in monkeys. See Nigel Hawkes, Baby Race That May
Be Too Fast for Safety, TIMES LONDON, Oct. 10, 1998, at 4. "Animal colonies cost a fortune to
maintain," he said. Id. And because there is a ban on federal-research money being spent on
embryo research, "we have no research dollars." Id.
25 See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Docyte Cytoplasm Transfers and the Ethics of Germ-Line
Intervention, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 211, 214 (1998).
26 David I. Hoffman et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their Availability for
Research, 79 FERTILIfY AND STERILITY 1063, 1063-69 (2003).
27 See, e.g., Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Factors That Affect Infertility Patients' Decisions About
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1623 (2006) [hereinafter Lyerly et al.
2006]; Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Fertility Patients' Views About Frozen Embryo Disposition:
Results of a Multi-Institutional US. Survey, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 499 (2010) [hereinafter
Lyerly et al. 2010]; Robert D. Nachtigall et al., How Couples Who Have Undergone In Vitro
Fertilization Decide What To Do With Surplus Frozen Embryos, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2094
(2009) [hereinafter Nachtigall et al. 2009]; Robert D. Nachtigall et al., Parents Conceptualization
of Their Frozen Embryos Complicates the Disposition Decision, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY 431
(2005) [hereinafter Nachtigall et al. 2005].
28 Lyerly et al. 2010, supra note 27, at 508.
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particular embryos, and altruistic motivations. The essay then considers how
inter-embryonic transfer would fit into this framework and assesses how couples
who espouse a variety of ideological stances would regard it as a disposition
option. This discussion is deepened through a comparison between frozen
embryo disposition and organ donation. This essay concludes with the assertion
that inter-embryonic transfer offers unique opportunities to infertile couples with
cryopreserved surplus embryos and might prove a more comfortable option than
existing choices. Simply put, options such as nuclear or cytoplasmic transfer-
collectively referred to as "inter-embryonic transfers"-acknowledge, support,
and effectuate couples' emotional connections and preferred outcomes for their
embryos as no other disposition option can.
II. HOW EMBRYOS INSPIRE EMOTIONAL CONNECTIONS
At the heart of this essay is not an embryo's moral status per se, but a
related issue: the emotional reactions that embryos-and their actual or potential
uses-engender. Embryos trigger emotions,2 9 as any woman who has undergone
in vitro fertilization can attest. On the morning of transfer, the intended mother is
usually offered a picture of the embryos that are transferred back into her uterus.
That image seems to capture so much-the emotional energy required to ride the
IVF rollercoaster, which jolts around in extremes of hope and despair; the hours
spent in the fertility clinic for doctor's appointments, tests, blood draws, and
ultrasounds; the expense of required medications and treatment; the discomfort,
even pain, of massive ovaries and drug injection sites; the retrieval surgery. All
that-for these. For the intended mother, this picture confirms that she has
accomplished all she can in order to ensure that the cycle results in a successful
pregnancy, and also that she is "pregnant until proven otherwise"-a phrase that
female infertility patients use to denote the expectant state in which one awaits
the "beta" pregnancy test. Until that "otherwise" arrives, one is free to regard this
image as a first baby picture.
Consistent with their own commercial interests, the fertility industry
acknowledges and even fosters the formation of emotional attitudes towards
frozen embryos. A page on the website of the American Fertility Association
addressing prospective embryo donors states, "[a]t either end of the [assisted
reproductive technologies] outcome spectrum, there are former patients, like you,
wrestling with the emotionally-laden decision of what to do with the
cryogenically preserved embryos they gave so much to create but will never
use." 30  Fertility clinics foster emotional connection to embryos by giving
intended mothers pictures of transferred embryos and by encouraging them to
29 See infra Part II and accompanying footnotes.3 0 American Fertility Association, Embryo Donation-Prospective Donors,
http://www.theafa.org/library/article/embryo donationprospectivedonors/ (last visited Dec. 24,
2010).
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watch the transplantation procedure on an ultrasound screen-and perhaps even
giving them an ultrasound picture of the newly transferred embryos "at home" in
the uterus.
Even without these affective inducements, it is logical that infertile
couples would feel some emotional attachment to their embryos-including ones
that are "left over" after an 1VF cycle.32 One does not come by such embryos
easily; they are the product of a great deal of labor-financial, emotional,
physical, and psychological. They offer hope; infertile individuals may regard
them as the "golden eggs" necessary to conceive that which is impossible to
come by (or nearly so) outside the laboratory. They possess the potential for life;
whether fresh or frozen, they embody the potential to develop into ardently
desired children. They symbolize a journey accomplished and perhaps a shortcut
to future pregnancy attempts, cutting out the retrieval process of a "fresh" IVF
cycle. They are usually genetically related to one or both of the intended parents;
the "overwhelming majority" of frozen embryos in the United States were
formed from the gametes of both a husband and wife." For these reasons and
many more, leftover embryos-often affectionately termed "embies" or
"frosties" by infertile couples-are sentimental objects for intended parents. As
Naomi Cahn acknowledged in Test Tube Families, "my husband and I kept our
extra embryos on ice for more than a decade. When it came time for us to
dispose of them, I did feel an emotional connection to them and found it difficult
simply to flush them down the drain."34
Emotional attachments to embryos develop and change over the course
of IVF treatment, and are influenced by how an infertile couple experiences IVF
as well as treatment outcomes. At the inception of IVF treatment, individuals are
unlikely to have "settled moral views or reflective preferences" about their
embryos, and the "process of infertility treatment, whether successful or not,
profoundly influences what these preferences turn out to be."35 The type and
intensity of emotions that frozen embryos evoke likely differ according to the
extent that an individual feels the embryo is unique, morally significant, or even
child-like-an enormously complex judgment tied to an individual's ideological,
political, and spiritual beliefs, as well as that individual's connections to the
embryo, her life plans, and the outcome of the cycle in which the embryo was
created. These emotional connections have consequences, affecting what
31 Such images have also been used to generate emotional affect in the abortion context. See Carol
Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56
UCLA L. REv. 351 (2008).
32 Excess embryos may remain for any number of reasons. An IVF cycle may generate more
embryos than a couple, in consultation with their reproductive endocrinologist, wish to implant in
that cycle, necessitating that these extras be frozen.
33 Nachtigall et al. 2005, supra note 27, at 434.
34 NAOMI CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES 175 (2009).
3 Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, at 1629.
36 See id.
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happens to these frozen embryos when the intended parents are done with child
bearing.
Individuals obviously differ as to when and for what purposes it is
morally permissible to destroy an embryo: Should one destroy an embryo to
eradicate a disease? For research? For any or no reason at all? Still others may
feel that embryos do not merit "special" regard but deserve the same respect as
any other item of private property. Here, it would be morally permissible for
individuals to act in any way towards an embryo, so long as that individual had
"ownership" of it.3 1
III. HOW EMOTIONAL TIES TO FROZEN EXCESS EMBYROS
IMPACT DISPOSITION DETERMINATIONS
Research on embryo disposition decisions has outlined a decision-
making process through which most couples undergoing IVF generally
proceed. In the midst of IVF treatment, extra embryos provide "reassurance" to
couples that treatment will enable them to conceive; but after completing IVF
treatment and considering themselves finished with efforts to conceive, most
couples initially devote little thought to what to do with these surplus embryos.39
Precisely how this postponement of disposition decisions intersects with couples'
emotional attachments to their surplus embryos is unclear from the research
literature. Presumably, this emotional connection is present throughout this time
period and perhaps even motivates a delay in selecting a final method of
disposition and following through with that decision. When reminded of the
need to decide their frozen embryos' disposition, often by bills received years
after the embryos were frozen, they experience "discomfort, and uncertainty"
about choosing an option; after deciding on the embryos' disposition, however,
couples most often experience "a profound sense of completeness and
resolution."40 Confronted with this decision, most couples begin by assessing
whether or not they wanted to conceive additional children, a decision driven by
considerations such as age, financial status, and the intended parents' health;
couples who were willing to continue efforts to conceive were likely to attempt
pregnancy by thawing and transferring the frozen embryos.
The reasons why embryos are "left over" may affect intended parents'
feelings towards them. Sentimental ties may be strongest when there were
simply too many high-quality fertilized embryos to choose from; these embryos
were just not selected even though they, too, were excellent candidates for
" See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J.
1015 (2010).
38 This decision-making process is regarded as the "the norm"; however, as discussed earlier,
infertile couples may evince a range of reactions.
3 Nachtigall et al. 2005, supra note 27, at 433.
401d.
41 Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, at 1625.
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transfer into the intended mother's uterus. To some women, such embryos may
seem like "sisters" or "brothers" to already-born children conceived through the
same cycle. An article in the Boston Globe profiled "Linda," a mother of twins
conceived through IVF who had agreed with her husband to discard their frozen
embryos but could not bring herself to do it.4 2 Linda confessed that when it came
time to discard the embryos, "I couldn't [throw them away). Our children were
in the same batch. I'd look at them and think, 'Wow, if someone had grabbed a
different straw, our children would still be sitting there." 43 The embryos may
have lagged behind developmentally so that they were smaller on the morning of
transfer, when the embryologist made her selection, yet healthy enough to
develop to the point of being worthwhile to freeze. Perhaps all fertilized
embryos from an IVF cycle were frozen for a particular reason, such as the
woman's inability to complete the cycle for health reasons. Perhaps the embryos
represent an intended parent's last chance to conceive, as they incorporated that
individual's last viable eggs or sperm.
What happens after the IVF cycle in which "left over" embryos are
created also affects the intended parents' emotional attitudes towards them.
Perhaps the IVF cycle was a success, producing one child, and the intended
parents hope to have additional children. Or perhaps the intended parents got
pregnant with twins or higher order multiples and reached their desired number
of children. If the IVF cycle was not successful, the intended parents may wish
to try again, but using fresh-not frozen-embryos; over eighty percent of IVF
cycles use fresh embryos." Alternately, an unsuccessful cycle may have been
followed by another tragic blow, such as the death of one of the intended parents,
or their divorce.
Determining how to dispose of excess frozen embryos is a highly
complex and emotionally difficult, even excruciating process, fraught with delay
and indecision. Though portrayed as a public issue through public discussion of
related issues such as the ethics of stem cell research and its funding, infertile
couples experience the embryo disposition decision as a private burden, in which
they often feel alone, uninformed, and without necessary guidance.45 Perhaps for
that reason, a significant majority of couples put off the decision for several years
after completing IVF treatment, whether from a lack of guidance or from a
conscious decision to ignore the issue, or a combination of these and other
factors." Observing that seventy-two percent of couples in his study had not
decided upon a disposition for their frozen embryos, Nachtigall concluded that
this decision was "a significant and frequently unresolved issue in couples' lives
in many countries, with many couples changing their minds about their initial
42 Alison Lobron, The Maybe-Baby Dilemma, BosTON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/health/articles/2009/11/22/the maybebabydilemma/?page=1.
43 Id.
4 Lyerly et al. 2010, supra note 27, at 499.
4 5 Id. at 500.
46 Id.
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disposition determination made prior to undergoing IVF."4 In fact, it is
estimated that seventy percent of couples with embryos delay their decisions for
five years or more, or even indefinitely.48 But emotional conceptions of embryos
are highly likely to change over time, giving rise to changes in disposition
preferences. Even when couples do make disposition decisions, either before an
IVF cycle or at some later point, statistics show that approximately three-quarters
of them will change their minds.4 9 Thus, as numerous researchers have observed,
the disposition of frozen embryos is "a significant and frequently unresolved
issue in couples' lives in many countries."so
Deciding not to use frozen embryos for future pregnancy attempts does
not, however, end couples' emotional attachment to their embryos; couples still
very much care about their welfare.5 ' Even couples who are sure that they do not
want additional children may be reluctant to decide upon a disposition because of
the important symbolic functions that excess embryos can fulfill. For instance,
couples may regard frozen embryos as a "genetic or psychological insurance
policy," believing that they may one day provide important medical services to
existing children--or become a means of conceiving new children if living
children should perish through illness or accident.5 2 Similarly, frozen embryos
may also be a reproductive "security blanket"53 that preserves and extends a
couple's fertility. Finally, frozen embryos may also serve as "symbols of the
infertility that had dominated their lives for so many years," or as "unfinished
business" that prompted women to attempt to conceive additional children to
"use them up," even when that desire was impractical.54
It is useful to narrow our focus to infertile couples who have decided
they do not wish to have any additional children, thereby eliminating the
possibility of using the remaining embryos to attempt pregnancy. These couples
must consider numerous factors, such as personal beliefs, values, attitudes about
the embryos' moral status, emotional ties to the embryos, individual
circumstances, embryo quality, and institutional information about various
disposition choices and support in effecting them.5
Infertile couples who do not wish to use their frozen embryos for
additional pregnancy attempts may choose among several disposition options. In
most states, couples may elect to thaw and discard their cryopreserved embryos,
with or without a "disposal ceremony"; some states, however, have made this
47 Nachtigall et al. 2005, supra note 27, at 433.
48 Lyerly et al. 2010, supra note 27, at 500.
49 Nachtigall et al. 2005, supra note 27, at 433.
soId
51 Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, at 1627.
52 Nachtigall et al. 2005, supra note 27, at 433.
s3 Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, at 1625.
54 Nachtigall et al. 2005, supra note 27, at 433.
ss Nachtigall et al. 2009, supra note 27, at 2094.
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illegal. In most states, couples also may choose to donate them to research,
where the embryos will enable advances in fertility medicine, stem cell research,
or disease eradication before ultimately being destroyed. Frozen embryos may
be donated to another infertile couple, who will use them in attempts to become
pregnant. Finally, couples may elect to freeze their embryos indefinitely-an
expensive option that entails the payment of annual cryopreservation fees.
In recognition of the moral difficulties, a small minority of clinics offer
the option of a disposal ceremony to allow the couple time and space to mourn
the loss, and, more striking, an entirely separate option known as "compassionate
transfer." In "compassionate transfer" surplus embryos are transferred into the
intended mother's uterus in a manner rendering pregnancy unlikely; the transfer
may be scheduled for a time when the woman is likely to be least fertile, the
woman may not take the hormones necessary to prepare her body for the transfer,
or she may elect to have the embryo transferred into her vagina instead of her
uterus. 9 Infertile couples may choose compassionate transfer because it may
speak to a sense of physical connectedness to the embryos, and may seem more
"humane" or "natural" than other forms of destruction because the body absorbs
these transferred embryos just as it would any embryos that fail to implant in an
IVF cycle.60 These options, however, are rarely available; only five percent of
American clinics offer disposal ceremonies or compassionate transfers.6 1
According to the most recent research study assessing infertile couples'
disposition preferences (which is also the largest and only multisite study to
directly analyze this issue), roughly twenty-eight percent of participants either
believed that embryos had human moral status or felt that they did not; the
62
convictions of most lay somewhere in between these two extremes. In addition,
forty-one percent of infertile couples who did not want additional children
considered research donation very likely, as compared with sixteen percent who
favored reproductive donation and twelve percent who leaned toward thawing
and discarding their frozen embryos. Seventy percent of such couples were
very unlikely to choose compassionate transfer, sixty-four percent stated that
they were very unlikely to keep their embryos frozen indefinitely, sixty percent
were very unlikely to select a disposal ceremony, fifty-three percent were very
unlikely to donate their frozen embryos to another couple, and forty-three percent
56 Discarding embryos is illegal in several states such as Louisiana, although these statutes'
constitutionality has not yet been tested. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2004) (stating that
an embryo created through IVF is a "juridical person" that cannot be intentionally destroyed); see
also Carbone & Cahn, supra note 38, at 1037-46 (summarizing state laws).
5 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125300, et seq. (2008) (specifically authorizing stem
cell research and establishing procedures for embryo donation).
58 See Nachtigall et al. 2009, supra note 27, at 209.
s9 See Lyerly et al. 2008, supra note 27, at 500.
6 Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, at 1628.
Lyerly et al. 2010, supra note 27, at 507.
62 Id. at 503.
61 Id. at 502.
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were very unlikely to thaw and discard them, as compared to only eighteen
percent who were very unlikely to donate their embryos to research.64
Significantly, approximately seventy-five percent of respondents rated the same
four factors as important in their disposition decisions: "wanting to help find
cures for diseases like Alzheimer disease," "not wanting someone else to whom I
could donate my embryos raising my genetic child," "my feeling that thawing
and discarding is wasteful," and "my partner's/spouse's opinion about what to do
with the embryos."
In choosing among these various disposition options, many infertile
couples must struggle through a complex panoply of emotions and moral
evaluations. Researchers have identified three main factors influencing infertile
couples' affective stances towards cryopreserved embryos: their conceptions of
the embryos' moral status, their perceived "parental" responsibility or obligation
to the embryos, and altruistic desires.
Research suggests that the embryo's moral status-whether the embryo
is seen as a "human"6 entity with a right to life in and of itself-is recognized by
"virtually all couples."68 Couples may imagine their embryos as sentient beings
who could potentially experience pain, or conceptualize them as "virtual"
children that had interests that must be safeguarded-a viewpoint that is
particularly meaningful when infertile couples consider donating their embryos
to another couple and cannot accept the possibility that others may raise their
genetic child. Couples may even go so far as to integrate the embryos into their
existing family-specifically as brothers or sisters of children already born that
they could one day meet, befriend, and in some nightmarish scenarios, with
whom they could fall in love.o
But the embryos' moral status alone determines the proper disposition
for only a few infertile couples, primarily those for whom religion also has a
significant impact on the selection of a proper disposition. Lyerly and others
conclude rather starkly that these individuals are most likely to be Catholic,
Evangelical Christian, or Baptist.7 ' Most couples in qualitative studies do not
accord embryos the same moral status or moral obligations as a human already
born, and some considered their embryos to be mere "cluster[s] of cells without
uniquely human moral rights or interests."7 2 Couples assigning high moral status
to their embryos were more likely to use them in future attempts to conceive,
donate the embryos to another couple for the same purpose, or to elect a disposal
64 id.
6s Id. at 502-03.
6 See Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, 1625-27.
61 Id. at 1626.
68 Nachtigall et al. 2005, supra note 27, at 433.
69 id
70 Id.
7' Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, at 1626.
72 id.
3252010]
UMKC LAW REVIEW
ceremony or compassionate transfer, illustrating that the ascription of high moral
status did not always entail refusing to destroy the embryos.7 Couples assigning
low moral status to their embryos were more likely to thaw and discard them or
donate them for research.74
However visible an embryo's moral status has been as a social, political
or legal issue, for most infertile couples it was not the central focus in their
disposition decision-making. Moral responsibility for embryos' fate-the duty to
safeguard excess embryos' future welfare-was a more important factor. Instead
of focusing upon the embryo's abstract moral status, couples preferred to
emphasize perceived concrete, quasi-parental obligations towards their surplus
embryos, or more specifically, towards their latent potential to develop into
children. Safeguarding the well-being of the children into which the embryos
might develop meant preventing the embryo from becoming a fetus and
ultimately an infant who would be gestated in another's body and raised in
another's home. Thus, feelings of moral responsibility towards embryos did
not oblige parents to ensure that embryos received a "chance at life"; this duty
entailed ensuring that the embryos would never have the opportunity to develop
further. From this perspective, the embryos' potential to become a child is just
as important to couples who make disposition decisions according to quasi-
parental obligations as it is to couples who decide solely on the basis of an
embryo's human moral status. In both contexts, this human potential shines
through; it is as if one is looking at an embryo as a hologram; if you turn it to the
left, you see a collection of cells, tilted to the right, it morphs into a child.
Donating frozen embryos to other infertile couples was therefore an
unpopular option because it entailed two difficult emotional processes:
surrendering embryos to which couples were emotionally attached and accepting
that they may develop into someone else's children, in effect, adopting out one's
own offspring.n In addition to predictable fears that "adopting" families might
abuse, neglect, or otherwise harm potential children, couples expressed concern
over "the possibilities for unintentional incest between full siblings or inadvertent
disclosure of IVF or donated gametes."78 Thus, couples who prioritized a quasi-
parental obligation to safeguard the embryos' future well-being were more likely
to thaw and discard them, donate them to research, or select a disposal ceremony
or compassionate transfer. Interestingly, research shows that infertile couples
tend to either support or oppose embryo research; the type of research for which
embryos are donated does not much matter.79
7 Lyerly et al. 2010, supra note 27, at 503-04.
74 id.
75 id.
76 Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, at 1628.
n Nachtigall et al. 2009, supra note 27, at 2095.
78 id.
79 Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, at 1627.
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Altruism also exerts significant influence upon infertile couples'
disposition decisions. Defined as "helping others" or "giving back,"80 altruism
captures infertile couples' perceptions that embryos are more than just human
tissue-unique, even precious resources that should be used for private or public
benefits such as conceiving life or conceiving knowledge. Couples with altruistic
motivations were likely to view thawing and discarding frozen embryos as
wasteful; the fact that the overwhelming majority of couples were very unlikely
to select this option testifies to altruism's strong influence.8 Perhaps the
subjective hardship of undergoing infertility or the fortunate experience of
successful treatment also predisposes couples to "pay it forward," creating
opportunities for individual and social benefit.82 Current disposition options
allow infertile couples to effect two forms of altruistic change: helping to
generate life, and helping to generate knowledge. Donating frozen embryos to
another infertile couple not only confers important altruistic benefits upon other
individuals but also allows donating couples to preserve the embryos' integrity
and the life-giving objectives with which the embryos were first created.
Donating frozen embryos to research expands the donation's altruistic impact
from individuals to larger segments of society, rendering it more abstract; this
option also allows couples to evade "entangling kinship ambiguities and
responsibilities." 84  Significantly, couples with "few or low-grade" embryos
might be more inclined to donate them to research instead of to another infertile
couple because of their diminished chances for successful implantation and
gestation. Effectuating altruistic desires therefore allowed infertile couples to
find a satisfying resolution to their disposition dilemmas, allowing couples to
pass through and then close the door on their infertility experience and their
embryonic emotional connections without inadvertently trapping any limbs in the
process.86 Unfortunately, however, a lack of institutional support for certain
altruistic disposition options that are theoretically possible but practically
difficult may thwart both couples' sense of closure and that option's potential
benefits. According to Nachtigall, most couples who wished to donate their
frozen embryos to another infertile couple "felt that the potentially daunting
financial, legal, and medical burdens of facilitating donation fell entirely on
them." 87
80 Nachtigall et al. 2009, supra note 27, at 2095.
81 Id. at 2096.
82 Lyerly et al. 2006, supra note 27, at 1627.
83 Nachtigall et al. 2009, supra note 27, at 2095.84 Id. at 2096.
81 Id. at 2095.
1 Id. at 2096.
1 Id. at 2095.
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IV. HOW INTER-EMBRYONIC TRANSFER COULD
REVOLUTIONIZE DISPOSITION DECISIONS
As a disposition option, inter-embryonic transfer accords with three of
infertile couples' top priorities in disposition decision-making: curing disease,
preventing others from raising any children developing from their embryos, and
avoiding the waste of thawing and discarding. Because inter-embryonic transfer
uses embryos in different ways than the existing disposition options, it has
distinctly different emotional ramifications for infertile couples and so
significantly alters the disposition decision calculus. This impact is best seen by
considering how inter-embryonic transfer would likely fit into the parameters
along which infertile couples make disposition decisions: assessments of
embryos' moral status, perceived parental obligations to particular frozen
embryos, and altruistic desires. This in turn prompts us to reconsider what it
means to "destroy" an embryo and, conversely, what it means to give an embryo
a "chance at life." For infertile couples who accord high moral status to frozen
embryos, believing that they have a "right to life" and should be given a "chance
at life," donation to research is not likely to be a viable option because it results
in the embryos' destruction." In this context, however, terms such as
"destruction" and "life" seem rather murky.
Until now, an embryo's "destruction" under existing disposition options
has referred to total, not partial, destruction, after which no part of the embryo
would remain. Giving an embryo a "chance at life" has referred to using it, or
allowing others to use it, in attempts to conceive. But in inter-embryonic
transfer, the entire embryo is not destroyed. The embryo as we know it ceases to
exist, but some of its key cellular matter is preserved. This key cellular matter-
health mitochondrial DNA-fuels the formation of new life when it is substituted
for diseased mitochondrial DNA. Thus, not only does this healthy mitochondrial
DNA continue to "live," it also enables the formation of another life.
It is fairly predictable how infertile couples with the most extreme views
on frozen embryos' moral status will regard inter-embryonic transfer. Most
couples believing that embryos are "lives in being" with full moral status will
likely oppose inter-embryonic transfer because it destroys the embryo's original
genetic integrity; 89 many infertile couples who differently conceptualize the
moral status they accord to frozen embryos, however, will likely see it as a viable
option. Some couples ascribing a somewhat higher moral status to their
embryos, however, do elect to have a disposal ceremony or compassionate
transfer, suggesting that inter-embryonic transfer will be at least a viable
disposition option, and perhaps even a more attractive one because of its unique
88 For a summary of the different viewpoints on the status of the embryo, see Katheryn D. Katz,
The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo: Implications for Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 303,
306 (2006).
89See, e.g., Hilary White, Britain's "3 Parent" Cloning Experiments Condemned, LIFESrrE NEWS,
Apr. 19, 2010, available at http://www.1ifesitenews.com/dn/2010/apr/10041909.html.
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abilities for preservation and creation. Some couples ascribing high moral status
to their embryos may view the genetic manipulation involved in inter-embryonic
transfer as "going too far," although the prerequisite that one undergo IVF to
obtain genetically related frozen embryos in the first place likely filters out those
to whom such practices are most unacceptable. It is uncertain how couples with
intermediate views would feel about inter-embryonic transfer, particularly those
couples who would prefer that the embryos have a "chance at life" without
running afoul of other concerns, such as felt obligations to safeguard the welfare
of any future children into which these embryos might develop.
Inter-embryonic transfer arguably has the most interesting impact upon
the decision-making options of infertile couples who feel that they have quasi-
parental obligations towards their frozen embryos-the duty to safeguard the
welfare of any future children that these embryos might produce. Donating to
research would ensure both that the embryos are not "wasted" and that they
cannot be gestated and develop into children raised in other families. This option
might not be ideal for donating couples who were troubled by the embryos'
ultimate destruction or for couples who still wanted to honor the life-giving
purpose for which the embryo was created but were frustrated by the abstract
way in which donating embryos to research effectuated this goal. There is
simply no option that would both preserve the embryo and prevent it from further
developing. Inter-embryonic transfer, however, would simultaneously allow an
infertile couple to mirror the intention for which the embryo was originally
fertilized-to create life-and the need to safeguard the embryos' welfare by
ensuring that the embryo will never become a child that is genetically the child of
the donating couple. Injected into another embryo with the nuclear DNA of
different intended parents, the donor embryo's mitochondrial DNA will fuel and
therefore help to create a life with another couple's genetic characteristics.90
Finally, with respect to altruism as a decision making factor, the
statistical unpopularity of the "thaw and discard" disposition option illustrates
that the overwhelming majority of infertile couples favor an altruistic disposition
where the embryo is not "wasted." But not all disposition options are equally
altruistic. Options that allow infertile couples to know precisely how their
donation will help others-where the donation has concrete, identifiable benefits
for specific individuals and specific results-may make these options seem more
altruistic than others in which the embryos' benefit is more abstract. Like
donation to research, inter-embryonic transfer is clearly an altruistic option: the
donor embryo's healthy mitochondrial DNA is used to power a cell whose own
mitochondrial DNA is diseased, thereby enabling that cell to survive and fulfill
90 In this sense, the procedure is somewhat like organ donation. See James R. Rodrigue, Danielle
L. Cornell, & Richard J. Howard, Pediatric Organ Donation: What Factors Most Influence
Parents' Donation Decisions? 9 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 180 (2008).
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its biological function: fetal development.91 Unlike donation to research, in
which the infertile couple must measure the donation's benefit in abstract
terms-helping society, helping others to conceive or overcome or avoid
illness-cytoplasmic transfer allows couples to help a particular couple to
overcome obstacles to conception, only without the risk of producing a child that
is the child of the donating parents. Thus, the emotional ramifications of inter-
embryonic transfer are somewhat of a hybrid between the affective implications
of donating to research and donating to another infertile couple for gestation-
the donating couple knows that the embryos will be used to effect the socially
useful goals of curing disease and creating life without the perils of creating a life
related to the donating couple. Thus, knowing exactly how one's embryos will
help others might lead infertile couples to perceive that inter-embryonic transfer
is more altruistic than donating frozen embryos to research.
Currently, the FDA's stance on genetic manipulation is an obstacle to
adding inter-embryonic transfer to the list of disposition options. Should this
change, the mechanics of adding inter-embryonic transfer as a disposition option
would not be difficult, and would likely mirror donation for research purposes, at
least as an initial matter. Donating couples would be able to elect that particular
option but would not be able to select particular forms of inter-embryonic
transfer (i.e., donation for mitochondrial disease versus donation to rehabilitate
aging eggs) just as they are not presently able to donate their embryos for specific
kinds of research.92  A future legal and policy issue likely will be donating
couples' ability to specify in more detail how donated embryos are to be used.
V. THE COMPARISON BETWEEN INTER-EMBRYONIC
TRANSFER AND ORGAN DONATION
Like infertile couples attempting to select a disposition for their frozen
embryos, relatives of organ donors are involved in an "ongoing quest to attribute
meaning."93 Infertile couples seek to find a disposition option that gives meaning
to their infertility experience and their emotional connections to their frozen
embryos, and relatives of organ donors similarly rely upon the act of donation to
give meaning to the donor's life and death.94 The idea that one's embryo donated
to cure mitochondrial disease can "live on" in a way parallels the affective
benefits experienced by family members of organ donors. Research suggests that
9 For discussion of the role of altruism in organ donation, see generally Jan A. Walker et al.,
Parental Attitudes Toward Pediatric Organ Donation: A Survey, 142 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J.
1383 (1990).
92See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, GUIDELINES ON
HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH (2009), available at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/2009guidelines.htm.
9 Thalia Bellali & Danai Papadatou, Parental Grief Following the Brain Death of a Child: Does
Consent or Refusal to Organ Donation Affect Their Griefr 30 DEATH STUD. 883 (2006).
94 id
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donating a relative's organs can positively affect family members' bereavement
because the donors' family members feel comforted by the donation process and
experience fewer depressive symptoms. 95 Organ donation allows something
positive to come out of tragedy. Donating organs also helps family members find
some meaning in a death. Parents who donated their children's organs felt that
donation eased grief in that it helped another human to life, facilitating relief,
tranquility, and a sense of purpose.96 Parents also believed that organ donation
also symbolically allowed their child to remain "alive" through the organ
recipient, facilitating an ongoing bond with the deceased child. This was
especially true if the child's heart was donated. The organ recipient becomes a
(hopefully temporary) link between the relative and the deceased.99 Organ
donation changes the tenor of the donor's death, from "meaningless, bad, and
private to . . . socially meaningful, good, and potentially heroic."' 00 One study
found that relatives' primary reason for donation was "the desire to keep the
deceased relative alive through identification with the recipients," which was
often fulfilled by seeking out information about them.' 0' Donors' relatives also
report that organ donation strengthens their bonds with society. 102 These positive
affective connections linking an organ donor's relative with the deceased donor
through the living organ in the recipient mirror the bonds between the donor
couple and the donated embryo through the mitochondrial DNA in the recipient
couple's embryo, and later, child. Helping to create or save another's life
through embryo or organ donation allows something positive to emerge from the
harrowing experiences of infertility and bereavement. Finally, in both contexts,
the act of donation keeps cherished emotional ties and memories alive, while
granting peace and perhaps even closure to those who decided to donate.
Just as options for disposing of excess frozen embryo that have more
concrete, localized, and "immediately" realizable benefits may be seen as more
altruistic than other options whose benefits seem more abstract, diffuse, and
delayed, certain forms of corporeal donation-grants of organ or tissue-are also
seen as conferring greater or lesser social benefit. The affective and altruistic
differences between donating frozen embryos to research and inter-embryonic
9 Shaila J. Merchant et al., Exploring the Psychological Effects of Deceased Organ Donation on
the Families of the Organ Donors, 22 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 341 (2008).
96 Bellali & Papadatou, supra note 94, at 898.
9 Id. at 893.
9 Id. at 896; see also Maryse Pelletier, Emotions Experienced and Coping Strategies Used by
Family Members of Organ Donors, 25 CANADIAN J. NURSING REs. 64 (1992) (stating "knowing
that someone was living a normal life, and that part of their loved one lived on lessened the pain of
having lost their loved one").
9 See Bellali & Papadatou, supra note 94, at 909; see also Magi Sque & Sheila A. Payne,
Dissonant Loss: The Experiences ofDonor Relatives, 43 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1359 (1996).
100 Orit Brawer Ben-David, Ranking Deaths in Israeli Society: Premature Deaths and Organ
Donation, II MORTALITY 79 (2006).
1o1 Sque & Payne, supra note 100, at 1366.
102 Ben-David, supra note 101, at 97.
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transfer can be compared to the distinctions between donating a relative's body to
science and donating a relative's organs to a living recipient. While donating a
relative's body to science for anatomical dissection is a laudable goal that no
doubt facilitates the accumulation of useful knowledge over time, knowledge is
considered less valuable in the short term than the preservation of life. 0 3 Organ
donation is therefore seen as more altruistic because it "has a direct life-saving
and immediate consequence."' Similarly, an infertile couple who donates their
embryos to research does not know what particular advances their embryos have
helped to bring about, but a couple who donates their embryos to cure
mitochondrial disease knows exactly what outcome their embryos facilitate:
powering the formation of new life.
VI. CONCLUSION: VIABLE EMBRYOS, VIABLE OPTIONS
Currently, many infertile couples report dissatisfaction with the range of
available disposition choices. There seems to be no "perfect fit"-an option that
simultaneously allows excess embryos to directly aid in the formation of new
life, precludes their further development, avoids their complete destruction, and
effectuates couples' altruistic desires. Yet, qualitative research has shown that
these considerations are among donating couples' top priorities: eradicating
disease, ensuring that others do not raise their genetic children, and "wasting" the
embryo by simply destroying it. Inter-embryo transfer as a disposition option
would align with these disposition goals, yielding results that are more tangible,
temporal, and particularized. Inter-embryo transfer also acknowledges and
effectuates the emotional connections that infertile couples may feel towards
their excess embryos-ties that prompt infertile couples to see them as points of
departure for some destiny grander than wholesale destruction. We may look
forward to the day when this novel, nascent potential may be fully realized.
103 Margaret A. Sanner, People's Attitudes and Reactions to Organ Donation, 11 MORTALITY 143
(2006).
1o4 id.
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